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Getting to Work: 
Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify  
(And Why They Should) 
Juliet P. Stumpf* 
Employment is traditionally conceptualized as a private contract between employer and 
employee. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which prohibited 
employers from knowingly hiring employees not authorized to work and required employers to 
request evidence of work authorization, introduced the government into this private relationship as 
an immigration enforcer and recast the employer as an immigration law gatekeeper. Today, 
comprehensive immigration reform initiatives propose to implement a nationwide system called E-
Verify through which employers check employees’ work authorization via on-line government 
databases. E-Verify unveils how the employment verification laws establish U.S. employees as a 
class circumscribed by government authorization to work. More than IRCA, it increases the 
presence of government in the establishment of the employment relationship for all employees, 
regardless of citizenship status. E-Verify represents a contemporary example of a recurring 
phenomenon in U.S. immigration law: the imposition of immigration enforcement costs on the 
U.S. population as a whole. In pursuit of enforcement goals, E-Verify impacts significant 
individual interests. It does so by creating a very small risk per individual of a harmful error, but 
aggregates that risk across the working population. That small population-wide risk is paired 
with greater risks that the harmful error will fall on a minority of the population, unsettling the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Work is both venerated and despised. Capitalist and socialist systems 
concern themselves with who controls the means of production, the fruits of 
labor, and the regulation of the workplace. Paid work generates the income 
employees use to sustain themselves and their family, obtain goods, and support 
pastimes. Work also has social and personal meaning: it can communicate social 
status, enmesh employees in social networks, inspire, demoralize, degrade, bore, 
and frustrate. Work can be transformational,1 virtuous,2 or exploitative.3 In some 
 
1. See generally VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 
2005) (1929). 
2. See MAXINE HONG KINGSTON, THE WOMAN WARRIOR: MEMOIRS OF A GIRLHOOD 
AMONG GHOSTS 64 (1989) (“The sweat of hard work is not to be displayed. It is much more graceful 
to appear favored by the gods.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-651, at 3 (1996) (“[T]he values of work 
and family . . . form the foundation of America’s communities.”), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 
2184. See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
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settings (Washington, D.C., notoriously so; Portland, Oregon, reputedly not4), 
what work we do defines who we are. “What do you do?” asks for much less than 
the sum total of the activities you might be engaged in, and also more. It asks 
where you work, at what, for whom, perhaps when and how, and what that means 
for how you and the questioner will relate to one another after you’ve answered. 
The workplace has been hailed—cautiously—as “the single most promising arena 
of racial integration” in American society.5 All of this, however, depends upon 
access to work. This Article is about how immigration law is changing the way 
Americans gain access to the workplace. It is about the borderline between 
employment and exclusion from the workplace. 
Most of us tend to think of employment as a private agreement between 
employer and employee.6 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA) introduced immigration enforcement into this private relationship, 
requiring employers to ask new employees to present documents showing identity 
and authorization to work in the United States.7 IRCA is an immigration law, 
targeted at and primarily affecting noncitizens. Yet IRCA, together with E-Verify, 
an electronic system that uses online government databases to carry out IRCA’s 
directive, places burdens on all U.S. employees, including U.S. citizens. E-Verify 
electronically compares the documents every new employee presents to an 
employer with information in the Social Security Administration (SSA) and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) databases in order to identify 
employees who lack work authorization. This Article explores the implications of 
a strategy that engages the U.S. workplace and its inhabitants in the law 
enforcement quest to target noncitizens present unlawfully.8 
E-Verify is poised for nationwide implementation. It has been a cornerstone 
of major immigration reform initiatives.9 In May 2011, the Supreme Court opened 
 
No. 104-193, §§ 817, 852. 
3. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND 
THE I.N.S. 8–9 (1992). 
4. Portlandia: Farm (Broadway Video Entertainment broadcast Jan. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.ifc.com/videos/portlandia-portland-dream-of-the-90s.php (“Portland is a city where 
young people go to retire.”). 
5. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 9 (2003). 
6. E.g., Employment, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 8, 2011, 1:42 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Employment (“Employment is a contract between two parties, one being the employer and the other 
being the employee.”) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (5th ed. 1979)). 
7. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(b), 100 Stat. 
3359, 3365–68 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2006)). But cf. infra notes 36–51 and accompanying 
text (noting that immigration laws aimed at the workplace existed prior to 1986, but targeted 
employees based on race or employers based on employment sector). 
8. See Immigration Reform and Control Act §§ 3360–69. 
9. E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 21–22 
(May 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf 
(proposing phasing in mandatory use of E-Verify while strengthening some employee protections); 
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the door for states to mandate that employers use the E-Verify system, with 
restriction or revocation of the employer’s business license as the sanction for 
failure to comply.10 The federal government requires most of its contractors to use 
the system and nearly twenty states mandate that some or all of its employers use 
E-Verify.11 
Most scholarship on E-Verify has been devoted to its effect on noncitizens 
and minorities: critiquing whether it works as intended,12 increases 
discrimination,13 opens the door to state regulation of immigration,14 or disrupts 
 
S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302 (2007) (proposing implementation schedule for national use of E-Verify 
by all employers); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (passed by 
Senate, May 25, 2006). 
10. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985–87 (2011). 
11. See Table: States Requiring E-Verify, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13127#10 (last updated Nov. 4, 2011). 
12. See Danielle M. Kidd, Note, E-Verify: Promoting Accountability and Transparency in Federal 
Procurement through Electronic Employment Verification, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 829 (2011) (analyzing the costs 
and benefits of the E-Verify program and concluding that its benefits outweigh the costs); Carl 
Wohlleben, Note, E-Verify, A Piece of the Puzzle Not a Brick in the Wall: Why All U.S. Employers Should Be 
Made to Use E-Verify, Just Not Yet, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 137, 141 (2009) (describing 
flaws in E-Verify and government attempts to improve the system); see also Amy Peck, E-Verify: The 
Good, The Bad and the Unresolved, NEBRASKA LAWYER, Apr. 2011, at 15 (explaining that tentative 
nonconfirmations and erroneous information are “still a way of life” when using E-Verify). 
13. See WESTAT CORP., FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION, REPORT 
SUBMITTED TO U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 235, 242, 250 (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf 
[hereinafter WESTAT REPORT] (assessing the rates of discrimination by employers); see also Matthew 
C. Arentsen, Comment, Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson: Employment Authorization Laws, States’ 
Rights, and Federal Preemption—An Informed Approach, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 390–92 (2011) 
(contending that state-mandated participation in E-Verify will not increase employment 
discrimination); Kati L. Griffith, Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal 
Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 417 (2011) (explaining that subfederal 
laws expanding IRCA and mandating E-Verify “encourage employment discrimination because they 
place extra burdens on employers and expand the use of E-Verify beyond what IRCA requires”); 
Kidd, supra note 12, at 841–43 (arguing that E-Verify will not change the potential for discrimination); 
Darcy M. Pottle, Note, Federal Employer Sanctions as Immigration Federalism, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 99, 
116-19 (2010) (outlining the E-Verify program and noting that E-Verify’s “false negatives 
disproportionately affect persons born outside of the United States”) (quoting Problems in the Current 
Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement System:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. and Int’l Law of the H. Comm.on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 58 (2007) 
(testimony of Marc Rosenblum, Dept. of Political Science, University of New Orleans)). 
14. See generally Arentsen, supra note 13 (analyzing appellate decisions weighing preemption 
challenges to state laws that mandate employer participation in the federal E-Verify program); Naomi 
Barrowclough, E-Verify: Long Awaited ‘Magic Bullet’ or Weak Attempt to Substitute Technology for 
Comprehensive Reform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 798–805 (2010) (evaluating the question of 
nationalizing E-Verify in light of state integration or rejection of E-Verify); Rachel Feller, Preempting 
State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona’s Improper Legislation in the Field of “Immigration-Related 
Employment Practices,” 84 WASH. L. REV. 289 (2009) (arguing that Congress created and occupied a new 
field of immigration-related employment practices that preempts state regulation); Mark S. Grube, 
Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Reconciling Local Enforcement with 
Federal Immigration Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 418–22 (2010) (analyzing E-Verify’s procedures 
and enforcement in the context of conflict preemption); Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: 
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labor and employment protections for undocumented workers.15 This Article 
takes a different path. It engages E-Verify as a contemporary example of a 
recurring phenomenon in U.S. immigration law—the imposition of immigration 
enforcement costs on the U.S. population as a whole. E-Verify is an immigration 
enforcement program that will mandate participation from most of the working 
population in the United States. Broad implementation of E-Verify may impose 
actual and potential harms on that larger population through error, misuse, 
discriminatory effect, or a decrease in individual autonomy. 
With E-Verify, that threat is multifold. First, prior to their E-Verify database 
check, all work-authorized employees will face a risk of finding themselves 
erroneously barred from employment that is different in nature from the risk 
under the current I-9 Form-based system. The second risk is that government 
agencies whose databases E-Verify relies on may use their new access to 
employment information in undesirable, liberty-constraining ways. E-Verify 
introduces the Department of Homeland Security, an agency with a national 
security and law enforcement agenda, into the employment process as a decision 
maker. That raises concerns that the agency may use the information about 
employees that E-Verify receives for its own primary mission. 
These risks are universal. They are faced by all employees, regardless of 
citizenship or immigration status. Added to these individual risks are structural 
risks. Widespread use of E-Verify may change the nature of the workplace in 
unexpected and uncomfortable ways. 
Understanding the impact of E-Verify on the mainstream U.S. employee is 
important for three reasons. First, it has the potential to change the current 
discourse on immigration enforcement and reform by changing public 
perspectives on modern immigration enforcement strategies. When immigration 
enforcement affects citizens, even in small ways, citizens have reason to pay 
attention to issues that affect noncitizens. Policymakers considering expansion of 
E-Verify and courts considering challenges to it must take into account the liberty 
interests of the ordinary citizen. 
 
What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 471–74 (2008) 
(advocating state implementation of mandatory E-Verify use laws); Jaime Walter, Comment, 
Congressional Preemption of Work-Authorization Verification Laws: A Narrower Approach to Defining the Scope of 
Preemption, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 289 (2010) (arguing that local statutes mandating work-authorization 
verification should succumb to field preemption). 
15. See David Bacon & Bill Ong Hing, The Rise and Fall of Employer Sanctions, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 77, 87–89, 91–92 (2010) (describing barriers to worker organizing and assertion of 
employment protections resulting from IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions and SSA database 
checks); Griffith, supra note 13, at 392, 441–49 (considering “the preemptive force of two baseline 
federal employment laws: the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964”); Lora L. Ries, B-Verify: Transforming E-Verify into a Biometric Employment Verification 
System, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 271, 285–86 (2010) (analyzing the E-Verify system’s potential for 
employer misuse). 
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Second, protecting the interests of the majority can enhance protection of 
minority interests when those interests overlap.16 If the liberty interests of 
mainstream U.S. employees converge with those of noncitizens or employees of 
color, interest-convergence theory suggests that courts will pay more attention to 
those interests.17 If E-Verify, in its mission to deter employment of 
undocumented workers, interferes with the ability of mainstream employees to get 
and keep jobs or otherwise diminishes the quality of the work experience, 
mainstream employees begin to share a common interest with undocumented 
workers or employees of color who experience discrimination. That common 
interest, held by a large majority, will attract the attention of both courts and 
policymakers. 
Finally, examining the interplay between the impact of E-Verify on 
mainstream employees and undocumented workers sheds light on how E-Verify 
could fundamentally change the nature of the workplace. E-Verify’s growing 
implementation expands the regulation of employees by federal agencies, law 
enforcement, and state actors. E-Verify introduces the DHS, an agency with a 
mission very different from labor regulation, into the establishment of the 
employment relationship. It creates room for states to play a larger role in 
immigration enforcement and employment when they mandate that employers use 
the E-Verify system and place state sanctions on failure to comply. 
This Article explores the concern that policymakers and courts at the 
national or the state level will ignore or, at best, discount these diffuse, 
unquantifiable risks. Failing to understand how E-Verify could affect the liberty 
interests of employees will impoverish the discussion about whether to implement 
E-Verify on a national level. Added to this is the strong perception that E-Verify 
is purely an immigration enforcement program, despite its application to all 
employees. These barriers raise the likelihood that diffuse liberty interests will be 
traded away by policymakers for what are perceived as more concrete benefits in 
the form of stronger immigration enforcement and deterrence of unlawful 
migration. 
Part II of this Article lays out a history of employment law as a backdrop for 
IRCA and E-Verify. It briefly describes the E-Verify system and locates it in a 
uniquely delicate moment: the inception of employment. Part III describes the 
challenge for democratic institutions of properly evaluating the nationwide 
adoption of a program that has benefits for a majority but disproportionately 
burdens a minority. It lays out several critiques of the E-Verify system. Part IV 
 
16. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our Racial History, 66 
U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004) (describing the interest-convergence theory). 
17. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1723, 1728 (2010) (explaining several ways in which unauthorized migrants may assert 
“oblique versions of rights that U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents can exercise in the same 
settings”). 
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analyzes the increased role that E-Verify establishes for the federal and state 
governments in the creation of the employment relationship and the ways that E-
Verify changes the relationship between employers, employees, and applicants. It 
evaluates whether the majoritarian interest in greater liberty has the potential to 
collaterally protect the interests of the more vulnerable minority of employees 
who will suffer the greatest harms18 upon the national application of E-Verify. 
II. CROSSING THE BORDERLINE: ACCESS TO WORK 
E-Verify and the employer sanctions laws represent the coming together of 
two historical approaches to employment. The first is the traditional conception of 
at-will employment operating within a relatively private employer-employee 
relationship. Coexisting with the at-will tradition is the history of government 
restrictions on access to the workplace for noncitizens, women, and ethnic and 
racial minorities. This Part will illustrate how IRCA’s employer sanctions 
provisions and E-Verify straddle these approaches, applying to the mainstream 
U.S. workforce the enforcement tools shaped through government efforts to 
restrict access to employment on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and 
citizenship status. 
A. Two Employment Histories 
1. At-Will Employment 
The traditional history of employment law in the United States traces the 
establishment of a powerful form of private contract as the mainstay of the 
employment relationship. The foundation of U.S. employment law has been the 
doctrine of at-will employment, which theorizes a private agreement between two 
relatively equal parties from which either party may withdraw at any time and for 
any reason.19 
 
18. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”); see also Cynthia Lee, Cultural 
Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 914, 959 (2007) 
(applying this theory to cultural defense claims of minority and immigrant defendants and concluding 
that these defendants are “more likely to receive accommodation when there is convergence between 
[American] cultural norms and [their] cultural norms”). 
19. Plona v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 558 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he employment-
at-will doctrine . . . permits an employer to terminate an at-will employment relationship ‘for any 
cause, at any time whatsoever, even if done in gross or reckless disregard of [an] employee’s rights.’” 
(quoting Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51, 55 (Ohio 1994))); Johnson v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 
808, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that under the employment-at-will doctrine “both employers and 
employees are free to end the employment relationship at any time, and for any reason, without 
liability”); Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 350–51 (2008) (describing at-will employment); see also Julie C. Suk, Discrimination 
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The development of the at-will doctrine during the Industrial Revolution 
originally endowed employees with the freedom to quit.20 Over time, however, the 
at-will doctrine came to entrench an employer’s freedom to fire its employees. 
Scholars have roundly critiqued the imprimatur that the at-will doctrine places on 
discharge without good cause because it tips the balance of power heavily in favor 
of the employer.21 
At-will employment relies on the relative absence of public regulation of 
hiring and firing. Judicial forbearance, in the absence of a clear statement, from 
enforcing contracts that restrict firing an employee exemplifies this reluctance to 
govern the employment relationship.22 When law does act affirmatively to regulate 
employment, it is often characterized as an intrusion. For example, employment 
discrimination law emerged as an inroad into at-will employment, prohibiting 
employers from relying on race or membership in other protected classes when 
taking adverse employment actions.23 
 
at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 78–80 
(2007) (describing at-will employment and exceptions to the general rule). 
20. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Dismissal Law in the United States: The Past and Present of At-Will 
Employment, INT’L COLLABORATIVE ON SOC. EUR. 2–4 (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342667 (describing the inception of the at-will doctrine during the 
Industrial Revolution as a move away from the “entire-contract doctrine” which penalized agricultural 
employees who left employment prior to the end of the harvest). 
21. E.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive 
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1406 (1967) (“It is the fear of being discharged 
which above all else renders the great majority of employees vulnerable to employer coercion.”); 
Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment As Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163, 166 
(2011) (reasoning that “the vast majority of individual workers lack the bargaining leverage or 
knowledge of their rights necessary to protect their investment by negotiating for job security”); contra 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (advocating for repeal of discrimination laws in favor of a return to 
freedom of contract and individual autonomy). See also James E. Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, 
A Natural Law Defense to the Employment Law Question: A Response to Richard Epstein, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 
363, 367, 375 (2001) (listing sources taking both sides of the question). 
22. See Ziegler v. Findlay Indus., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (explaining 
that “the mere inclusion of a . . . term [of years]” in an employment contract is not enough to 
overcome the “strong presumption of at-will employment unless the terms of the contract clearly 
indicate otherwise” (citing Henkel v. Educ. Research Council, 344 N.E.2d 118 (Ohio 1976))). 
23. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1655, 1655 (1996) (explaining that “[t]he employer’s presumptive right to fire employees at will—for 
good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all—has been drastically cut back in the last sixty 
years” and that the “at-will rule now coexists with numerous important exceptions—statutory and 
common law, state and federal—that prohibit . . . discrimination based on race, sex, age, or other 
characteristics.”); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of 
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (noting that at-will employment is a “fundamental 
assumption [that] has shaped our labor law”); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The 
Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653 (2000) (arguing that the expansion of modern tort 
law is gradually eviscerating at-will employment in America). 
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2. Coerced Labor and Barriers to Work 
Despite the rise in prominence of the at-will doctrine, U.S. law has always 
closely regulated access to work.24 Juxtaposed with the at-will realm of 
employment law were laws that channeled employment by means of racial, ethnic, 
gender-based, and citizenship status restrictions. Regulation of employment in the 
United States has tended to take the form either of requiring work or of denying 
entry to the workplace. In perspective, then, the at-will realm of freedom from 
government regulation of employment turned out to be a space bounded by legal 
restrictions and obligations that were racial, ethnic, and gendered. It also was, and 
remains, tightly bounded by citizenship and immigration law. 
Coerced work hearkens as far back as the colonial era, when laws 
institutionalizing slavery systematized the forced migration and dehumanization of 
African25 and Native American26 peoples in order to provide labor for the project 
of white settlement of the new landscape. Early European migration to the United 
States relied heavily on indentured servitude, through which migrants paid off 
their passage by working under an enforceable contract for a term of years, after 
which they became free to contract their own labor.27 After the Civil War, the 
Black Codes in most postbellum states imposed on freed blacks a legal obligation 
to work on pain of arrest. These laws authorized the sheriff to hire out the 
arrested freedman to white landowners.28 
Denying access to the workplace was not uncommon. In 1908, the Supreme 
Court confirmed that states could restrict women from working in a range of 
occupations and conditions because the performance of the “maternal function[ ]” 
 
24. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 21–26 (2006) (laying out a history of 
restrictive federal and state immigration laws); see, e.g., Coolie Trade Law, Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27, 
12 Stat. 340 (1862) (barring transportation of Chinese citizens “as servants or apprentices, or to be 
held to service or labor”). 
25. See Rhonda V. Magee, Slavery As Immigration?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 278–82 (2009); Kerry 
Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2009). 
26. E.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native 
Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1463–67 (2011) 
(describing the history of Native American enslavement in the colonies). See generally INDIAN 
SLAVERY IN COLONIAL AMERICA (Alan Gallay ed., 2009) (studying Indian slavery from various 
perspectives). 
27. See Alfred L. Brophy, Law and Indentured Servitude in Mid-Eighteenth Century Pennsylvania, 28 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 69, 85–90 (1991); Bradley J. Nicholson, Reflections on Capitalism, Property, and the 
Law of Slavery, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 151, 172–75 (2002). 
28. See, e.g., 1866 Va. Acts 91–92, ch. 28 (defining “vagrant” broadly to include former slaves 
and providing that a justice shall “order [a] vagrant to be employed in labor for any term not 
exceeding three months, and . . . to be hired out for the best wages that can be procured”); 1865 S.C. 
Acts 284–85, ch. 96–98 (1865) (declaring that a convicted vagrant may “be hired for such wages as 
can be obtained for his services, to any owner or lessee of a farm, for the term of hard labor to which 
he was sentenced”); see Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 419 
(2011) (locating the Black Codes within a larger context of involuntary labor). 
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made women the “object of public interest and care in order to preserve the 
strength and vigor of the race.”29 
More recent immigration law has its own examples of both compulsory labor 
and denial of access to the workplace. The Bracero Program, negotiated with 
Mexico in 1942, facilitated the migration of temporary Mexican contract laborers 
and conditioned the right to remain in the United States on continuing 
employment.30 Today, the United States conditions the validity of most temporary 
employment visas on a continuing employment relationship.31 When the job ends, 
the noncitizen becomes unlawfully present.32 While this is a far cry from 
indentured servitude, the threat of deportation as a consequence of quitting or 
being fired introduces an element of coercion into the relationship between 
employer and noncitizen employee. 
Immigration law has been marked not only by affirmative obligations to 
work, but also by government restriction on access to employment. In 1882, the 
first Chinese Exclusion Act imposed a ten-year ban on the immigration of Chinese 
laborers.33 The 1885 Contract Labor Law denied entry to noncitizens seeking to 
 
29. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1907); see also id. at 422 (explaining that “her physical 
structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her own 
health, but the well-being of the race—justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the 
passion of man” and thus “[t]he limitations which this statute places upon her contractual powers, 
upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for 
her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all”); Alice Kessler-Harris, Legal Theory & Gendered 
History, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 125, 129–30 (2010) (locating Muller v. Oregon in the context of 
historical ideas of individual liberty and contrasting the application of liberty to men and women). 
30.  See Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting the 
Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, Aug. 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1759, 1768; Agreement 
Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting the Recruiting of Mexican Non-
Agricultural Workers, April 29, 1943, 57 Stat. 1353, 1357; see also CALAVITA, supra note 4, at 19–25 
(providing historical context on the bilateral agreement on temporary migration for Mexican 
agricultural workers). 
31. See Peter H. Schuck & John E. Tyler, Making the Case for Changing U.S. Policy Regarding 
Highly Skilled Immigrants, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327, 342 (2010) (noting that for H-1B visa holders, 
after the visa term expires “or if the worker leaves the original sponsoring employer and does not get 
new sponsorship, he or she must leave the country” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a), (n))). 
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2011) (defining “aliens unlawfully present”); e.g., Tapis Int’l v. 
INS, 94 F. Supp. 2d 172, 174 (D. Mass. 2000) (pointing out that the immigration agency’s denial of 
petition to renew temporary H-1B employment visa subjected the noncitizen employee and his wife 
to potential removal from the United States). 
33. The Chinese Exclusion Acts include: Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 
1943) (suspending immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States for ten years); Scott Act, ch. 
1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888) (repealed 1943) (prohibiting Chinese laborers from returning to the United 
States after departure); Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (repealed 1943) (extending the ban on 
Chinese laborers); McCreary Act, ch. 14, § 2, 28 Stat. 7 (1893) (repealed 1943) (defining laborers to 
include merchants, laundry owners, miners, and fishers); Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 392, 
428 (repealed 1943) (reenacting and extending Acts without limitation); see also Act of Dec. 17, 1943, 
ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600, 600–01 (repealing the Chinese Exclusion Acts). 
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enter the United States if they arrived having previously contracted to work.34 For 
a long time, lawful admission to the United States has been predicated on a federal 
determination of a need for foreign labor as well as a private offer of 
employment.35 
3. Regulating Access to At-Will Employment: IRCA and E-Verify 
In 1986, the separate worlds of at-will employment for mainstream 
employees and restricted access to employment for noncitizens and other outsider 
groups merged. Until then, the law permitted employers to hire noncitizens 
unlawfully present in the United States.36 Congress passed IRCA in 1986 as part of 
an overhaul of the immigration laws.37 IRCA placed employers in the role of 
private immigration law screeners. It imposed on employers an obligation to 
request documents showing the employee’s identity and authorization to work 
from each new hire. It also required employers to refrain from hiring applicants 
unable to produce those documents.38 
For the first time, IRCA barred employers from hiring employees within the 
United States whom the government had not authorized to work.39 Ten years 
later, Congress mandated the creation of a pilot program for electronic verification 
of employment eligibility, now known as E-Verify.40 
 
34. Alien Contract Labor Law, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885) codified and amended by 8 U.S.C. § 
141 (1946) (repealed 1952); EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1798–1965, at 88–89 (1981). 
35. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(5)) (restricting admission of certain classes of employees based on the Department of Labor’s 
certification that there are insufficient qualified U.S. workers available to perform the job at the 
prevailing wage); id. § 203(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)) (listing preferences for employment-
based permanent immigration); id. § 101(a)(15) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)) (listing 
temporary visas including those providing temporary lawful presence for work-related reasons); see 
also Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 531–41(2007) (describing 
the inception of employment-based restrictions on immigration and the role of labor unions in that 
shift). See generally KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820–
1924 (1984) (offering a comprehensive history). 
36. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §274(a), 66 Stat. 163, 
228–29 (1952), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1986) (enacting the “Texas Proviso,” which exempted 
employment of unauthorized workers from the crime of harboring an unauthorized alien); see also 
Daniel J. Tichenor, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 194 
(2002) (describing the history of employer sanctions laws). 
37. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) 
(amending the Immigration and Nationality Act) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a); see Stephen Lee, 
Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1105–07 (2009). 
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2006). 
39. Id. § 1324a(a) (prohibiting employment of noncitizens without employment authorization); 
see Motomura, supra note 17, at 1760 (setting out a brief history of employer sanctions laws). 
40. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104–208, div. C, § 401(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-655 (1996); see also Chamber of Commerce v. 
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing the history of the Basic Pilot program 
that later became E-Verify). 
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IRCA imposed lawful immigration status as a new hiring criterion. While 
professional licensing requirements and felon disqualification laws had previously 
restricted access to certain professions and jobs, IRCA made a much more 
sweeping change. In requiring employers to verify that the government authorized 
the employee to work, IRCA established a permanent and public restriction on 
what most perceived as a private employer-employee contract. The law relocated 
the concept of government authorization to work from its roots in historical 
subordination and immigration control to the mainstream employment realm.41 
B. Navigating E-Verify 
Understanding the role of E-Verify in changing the nature of the workplace 
requires some knowledge of how the system works. The E-Verify system adds an 
electronic component to IRCA’s paper-based process for verifying the work 
authorization of new hires by means of a federal form. In essence, the employer 
enters into a computer certain information from each employee’s identity and 
work authorization documents.42 Through the Internet, the E-Verify program 
attempts to match the employee’s information to government databases 
maintained by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and DHS.43 If there is a 
match, the computer informs the employer that the new hire is authorized to 
work.44 If there is either no match or a mismatch between the information the 
employer submitted and data in the government database, the system will return a 
“tentative non-confirmation,” also known as a “TNC.”45 
At that point, the E-Verify system relies on the employer to provide the 
employee with a notice of the lack of employment eligibility confirmation along 
with instructions to contact a government agency to address the issue.46 If neither 
the SSA nor DHS can confirm the employee’s authorization to work, E-Verify will 
issue a notice to the employer of a “final nonconfirmation.”47 E-Verify will also 
return a final nonconfirmation or a “DHS No Show” notice if the employee does 
not contact the government within eight federal work days of E-Verify’s issuance 
 
41. See Stone, supra note 20, at 6 (describing a “dual labor market, comprised of insiders—
usually white, blue collar men in unionized firms—and outsiders—usually women, minorities, migrant 
workers and rural Americans[ ] ” left out of the more stable employment sectors). 
42. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, E-VERIFY USER MANUAL FOR 
EMPLOYERS, 15–17 (2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-
Verify_Native_Documents/manual-employer_comp.pdf [hereinafter E-VERIFY USER MANUAL]. 
43. Id. at 4. 
44. Id. at 22. 
45. Id. at 25; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-146, EMPLOYMENT 
VERIFICATION: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT 
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 8–11 (2010) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (detailing 
circumstances under which E-Verify will issue a tentative nonconfirmation in response to the 
information that the employer has provided). 
46. E-VERIFY USER MANUAL, supra note 42, at 27–38. 
47. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 9. 
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of a tentative nonconfirmation notice to the employer.48 There is no formal 
process to appeal a final nonconfirmation.49 
Upon receiving the final nonconfirmation, the employer is expected to 
terminate the new hire’s employment.50 If the employer continues to employ the 
individual after a final nonconfirmation, the employer is presumed to be 
knowingly employing an undocumented worker.51 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the primary agency that 
manages the program, characterizes E-Verify as largely voluntary.52 The 
authorizing legislation describes it as a pilot program with a four-year sunset,53 
though Congress has extended that expiration date.54 Nevertheless, mandatory 
participation is on the rise. While the federal government has not required private 
employers to participate in E-Verify, it is mandatory in federal government hiring 
and for most federal contractors.55 Many states have joined Arizona in requiring 
employers, public and private, to use E-Verify.56 Employers not subject to these 
federal and state requirements may choose whether to use E-Verify or continue to 
implement IRCA’s paper-based employment verification requirements. 
Regardless of the extent of employer choice to use E-Verify, representing E-
Verify as a voluntary program is inaccurate in an important respect. Participation 
 
48. E-VERIFY USER MANUAL, supra note 42, at 45–47. 
49. Id. at 39. 
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 13–14. 
51. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, div. C, § 403(a)(4)(C)(iii), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-655 to -665 (1996) (“If the person or 
other entity continues to employ (or to recruit or refer) an individual after receiving final 
nonconfirmation, a rebuttable presumption is created that the person or entity has violated [the 
employer sanctions provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A)].”); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, The E-Verify Program For Employment Verification Memorandum of Understanding, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 4 (2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-
Verify/Customer %20Support/Employer%20MOU%20(September%202009).pdf [hereinafter 
E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING] (enumerating the obligations of the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Social Security Administration, and the employer, and stating that “the 
Employer is subject to a rebuttable presumption that it has knowingly employed an unauthorized 
alien . . . if the Employer continues to employ an employee after receiving a final nonconfirmation”); 
see also GAO REPORT supra note 45, at 13–14. 
52. E-VERIFY USER MANUAL, supra note 42, at 4; see also IIRIRA § 402(a) (stating that “any 
person or other entity that conducts any hiring (or recruitment or referral) in a State in which a pilot 
program is operating may elect to participate in that pilot program” and, “[e]xcept as specifically 
provided . . . , the Attorney General may not require any person or other entity to participate in a pilot 
program”). 
53. IIRIRA §§ 401–04. 
54. See Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, 117 
Stat. 1944, 1944–45; Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 755, 755–56 
(extending E-Verify to September 2009); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83 123 Stat. 2142 (2009) (approving three-year extension to 2012). 
55. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 2 (citing Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpt. 
22.18). 
56. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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is involuntary for the population most likely to experience its shortfalls: 
employees. E-Verify employers must verify all new hires through the program, 
leaving no room for employees to opt out. 
This requirement exists both to ensure that employers use E-Verify for 
employees with questionable work authorization and to discourage discriminatory 
use.57 It prohibits employers from selectively verifying only certain employees due 
to an employer’s suspicion, based on perceived race, ethnicity, immigration status, 
national origin, or any other factor, that an employee may not be eligible to 
work.58 It is also meant to increase compliance with employment verification laws 
by making it more difficult for employers to hire employees who are not 
authorized to work.59 
Nevertheless, the requirement that employers screen all new hires means that 
employees cannot avoid any shortcomings of the program. E-Verify has a number 
of safeguards to protect work-authorized employees from improper termination 
and discrimination. An employer is statutorily barred from firing an employee 
because of a tentative nonconfirmation of the employee’s eligibility to work.60 Nor 
may employers use the system to prescreen applicants prior to hire.61 The law 
does not, however, specify any means of enforcing these safeguards. 
C. The Difference E-Verify Makes 
E-Verify represents a significant step beyond IRCA in entrenching 
immigration enforcement in the workplace. When IRCA divided U.S. employees 
into groups according to work authorization, it destabilized the conception of a 
private realm of employment contract but largely left the employer in the driver’s 
seat in enforcing that division. IRCA imbued the employer with the gatekeeping 
role of screening new hires, a function previously reserved to immigration 
 
57. IIRIRA § 404(d)(4) (requiring “reasonable safeguards against . . . unlawful discriminatory 
practices based on national origin or citizenship status”). 
58. Id. § 404(d)(4) (requiring the system to “have reasonable safeguards against the system’s 
resulting in unlawful discriminatory practices based on national origin or citizenship status, 
including—(A) the selective or unauthorized use of the system to verify eligibility; (B) the use of the 
system prior to an offer of employment; or (C) the exclusion of certain individuals from consideration 
for employment as a result of a perceived likelihood that additional verification will be required, 
beyond what is required for most job applicants”); E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 51, at 4–5. 
59. IIRIRA § 404(d)(4) (requiring safeguards against discrimination); Marc R. Rosenblum, E-
Verify: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Proposals for Reform, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/e-verify-insight.pdf (explaining that “E-Verify strengthens 
immigration enforcement” by detecting the most common fraudulent identification documents). 
60. IIRIRA § 403(a)(4)(B)(iii) (“In no case shall an employer terminate employment of an 
individual because of a failure of the individual to have identity and work eligibility confirmed under 
this section until a nonconfirmation becomes final. Nothing in this clause shall apply to a termination 
of employment for any reason other than because of such a failure.”); E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 5. 
61. E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 4. 
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enforcement officials.62 As a result, the face of immigration enforcement in the 
workplace––the employer’s face––remained largely private and entirely familiar. 
Although the existence of the legal prohibition and the threat of agency audits and 
raids may have influenced employer decision-making, the employer alone made 
the decision that mattered at the moment of hire, determining whether the work 
authorization documents were genuine on their face. 
E-Verify, in contrast, relegated the employer to the role of copilot to 
immigration officials in enforcing immigration law in the workplace. E-Verify 
delegates to the employer the ministerial function of gathering documents from 
the employee, feeding the information into the agency databases, and delivering 
the agency’s notice of failure to confirm employment eligibility. At the same time, 
E-Verify channels the employer’s greatest power, the power to discharge, to serve 
the ends of immigration control. 
In this way, E-Verify has made visible the Cheshire Cat of government 
control over work authorization. E-Verify unveils the way that the employment 
verification laws articulated a government power to endow employees with 
permission to work. Like the Cheshire Cat, this power remains present even when 
out of sight.63 By making each new hire contingent on an individualized inquiry to 
agency databases, E-Verify reveals U.S. employees to themselves as a class 
circumscribed by government authorization to work. 
III. THE BENEFITS AND FLAWS OF E-VERIFY 
This Part examines the impact of E-Verify on mainstream employees. It 
begins by evaluating the benefits that E-Verify proffers to civil society in the 
United States. It then evaluates two central flaws: the failure to verify the 
employment eligibility of a proportion of employees who are authorized to work, 
and the disparate impact of E-Verify errors on noncitizens of color, women, and 
naturalized citizens. E-Verify offers some benefits to the majority at a small risk 
per capita of some loss of liberty and a higher risk to certain minority employees 
of experiencing greater individual losses. 
A. Benefits of E-Verify 
In passing IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions and mandating the 
development of E-Verify, Congress intended to confer on U.S. society a more 
effective form of immigration control and also reduce discrimination based on 
 
62. Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 887, 940–41 (2006) (outlining the gatekeeping function that IRCA placed on employers 
and noting that both employers and undocumented employees have incentives to subvert good-faith 
compliance with employment verification programs). 
63. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 72–73 (S. MICHELLE 
WIGGINS illust., 1983). 
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perceptions of foreign appearance and accent.64 An effective employment 
eligibility verification regime would identify employees who were not authorized 
to work while accurately confirming the employment eligibility of U.S. citizens and 
work-authorized noncitizens. 
1. Identifying Undocumented Employees 
The USCIS website advertises E-Verify as a more accurate and efficient way 
for employers to determine the eligibility of their employees to work in the United 
States and “the best way employers can ensure a legal workforce.”65 A fully work-
authorized workforce would reduce the perceived need for workplace raids 
involving armed immigration agents, mass arrests, and criminal and civil 
prosecutions.66 It would also relieve the downward pressure on employee 
protections that the existence and availability of a malleable supply of 
undocumented employees creates. 
E-Verify’s capacity to affect these benefits by identifying employees who lack 
work authorization has attracted frequent critique.67 In a nutshell, the system 
oververifies by confirming as eligible for employment numerous employees who 
are not. Between April and June of 2008, E-Verify confirmed as work-authorized 
approximately 54% of employees who in fact were not authorized to work, or 
5.8% of the workers screened.68 E-Verify is currently unable to detect when an 
employee uses valid documents that are stolen or borrowed, or when an employer 
uses a work-authorized employee’s documents to verify another employee with 
questionable work eligibility.69 
 
64. IIRIRA § 403 (setting out pilot program purpose and requirements); § 404(d)(4) (requiring 
“reasonable safeguards against . . . unlawful discriminatory practices based on national origin or 
citizenship status”). 
65. E-Verify, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.dhs.gov/e-verify 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011); see also Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach 
to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 157 (2008) (asserting that E-Verify will cause 
undocumented immigrants to “self-deport”). 
66. Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1091, 1098–100 (2008) (noting that some companies decided to use E-Verify to 
avoid immigration raids, yet warrants for immigration raids “are often issued based on flawed 
information contained in databases” that underlie E-Verify); Kevin R. Lashus et. al., Fear the ICE Man: 
Lessons from the Swift Raids to Warm You Up—The New Government Perspective on Employer Sanctions, 32 
NOVA L. REV. 391, 398–401 (2008) (evaluating the belief that E-Verify participation will reduce the 
prevalence of ICE workplace raids and concluding that E-Verify may increase the likelihood of raids). 
67. See e.g., Pottle, supra note 13, at 117–20 (critiquing the efficacy of the system’s ability to 
identify undocumented new hires and describing other scholarly critiques). 
68. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13; accord Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6 (citing id.); GAO 
REPORT, supra note 45, at 3 (stating that “E-Verify could not detect identity fraud in the majority of 
cases where unauthorized workers presented their employers with valid documents that were stolen 
or borrowed” (citing WESTAT REPORT, supra note 14)). 
69. Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 5; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 3. 
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To date, most proposals to increase the effectiveness of E-Verify and 
maximize the intended benefit of a fully work-authorized workforce also 
marginally increase burdens on U.S. employees. Some have suggested the use of 
biometric data to allow the computer to match each individual employee with the 
information on her documents and in government databases.70 The biometric 
approach, at its simplest, would use photographs, fingerprints, retinal data, DNA, 
or some combination of that data, to match the individual with the information in 
the system.71 Another approach would allow work-authorized employees to lock 
their Social Security number within the E-Verify system to prevent fraudulent use 
of that number.72 Whether these burdens are justified depends on how heavy the 
costs are to U.S. employees as well as whether E-Verify can realize its other 
promised benefits. 
Moreover, E-Verify will succeed only by requiring or inspiring employers to 
cooperate with its mandates. Employers may, through error or intent, undermine 
E-Verify’s goals by declining to discharge identified undocumented employees or 
by failing to check all new employees through the system.73 USCIS has taken some 
measures to prevent this, including hiring monitoring and compliance staff and 
initiating the development of data analysis programs to detect employer fraud and 
noncompliance.74 If employers fail to terminate employees who receive a final 
nonconfirmation of their authorization to work, enforcement lies with 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).75 
A full evaluation of the success of these compliance efforts is beyond the 
scope of this article, but a few stumbling blocks are of note. First, the role of the 
employer as immigration enforcer will at times conflict with the profit-driven 
 
70. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 24 (describing the proposal as well as concerns about 
design costs, equipment costs and access to the technology for employers, and privacy and civil 
liberties of employees); Ries, supra note 15, at 271, 273 (“A biometric employment eligibility 
verification system can shift much of the burden and decision making from the employers to the 
federal government, creating a simpler and more accurate system for employers to use, while also 
eliminating the discrimination issues that emerged over the past two decades.”). 
71. See Ries, supra note 15, at 303. 
72. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 23. 
73. See Manns, supra note 62, at 967 (“[E]mployers could simply choose not to use the 
databases, ignore the databases’ negative responses, or tacitly or explicitly ask prospective employees 
to come up with other identity information . . . when there are doubts about the authenticity of 
identification materials. Employers might have incentives to serve merely as gatekeepers of their own 
self-interest in detecting potential violators, so that the information of undocumented aliens would 
not be processed into the verification system. So long as employers stand to gain from employing 
undocumented aliens and face a low risk of direct monitoring of noncompliance, they can be 
expected to continue to subvert their duties.”). 
74. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 24–29 (detailing attempts to improve employer 
compliance); see also Manns, supra note 62, at 944–60 (proposing private monitoring of the employer’s 
compliance with its immigration gatekeeping duty). 
75. Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Regarding E-Verify Program Information Sharing 2–3 (2008). 
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interest of employers when that interest favors hiring undocumented employees.76 
Second, the enforcement history of the employer sanctions laws prior to E-Verify 
generated criticism that it was insufficient and underprioritized, and it is unclear 
how that would change with a nationalized E-Verify.77 Finally, in its current 
embodiment, participation in E-Verify is voluntary for most private employers. 
The success of the program depends on whether employers perceive a benefit to 
using E-Verify and continue to use it. If USCIS too readily reports to ICE its 
suspicions about noncompliant employers, it may chill the participation of 
employers unwilling to expose themselves to the enforcement arm of immigration 
control and who are unlikely to attract ICE’s attention otherwise. To the extent 
that USCIS wants the program to succeed, it may lean toward conservatively 
reporting suspicions of employer misuse. 
2. Reducing Discrimination 
There is some evidence that E-Verify reduces conscious discrimination 
against employees based on citizenship status, ethnicity, or national origin. E-
Verify usually provides an answer to the question of whether a new employee is 
authorized to work. That answer appeases the uncertainty that some employers 
have felt about hiring employees whose ethnicity or noncitizen status they 
associated with unauthorized migration. According to a 2009 government-
commissioned study, more employers said that using E-Verify increased their 
willingness to hire noncitizens than said using E-Verify made them less willing to 
hire noncitizens.78 Presumably, that greater willingness could lead to lower levels 
of discrimination on the basis of both citizenship status and ethnicity.79 
B. E-Verify and Its Flaws 
E-Verify’s most acclaimed advantages are also the source of its greatest 
flaws. In the course of identifying employees without work authorization, E-
Verify erroneously identifies employees as not authorized to work in ways that 
create disparate impacts on employees. 
 
76. See Lee, supra note 37, at 1107. 
77. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, infra note 7; see also Lee, supra note 37, 
at 1103 (explaining why some level of cooperation between employer and immigration enforcement 
officials benefits both, in that the relationship between employer and DHS “can often be highly 
collaborative and mutually beneficial, where the DHS overlooks employer indiscretions in exchange 
for help identifying potentially removable immigrants”). In 2008, ICE conducted 503 employer 
payroll audits. See Rosenblum, supra note 68, at 10 n.41 (citing ICE Worksite Enforcement—Up to the 
Job?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. Pol’y and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 83 (2011) (statement of Kumar Kibble, Deputy Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security)). In 2010, that number increased to 3,500. Id. 
78. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 254. 
79. See JUDITH GANS, UDALL CTR. FOR STUD. IN PUB. POL’Y, ARIZONA’S ECONOMY AND 
THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT 15 (2008) (reasoning that the Westat findings suggest a net 
reduction in citizenship status discrimination) (citing WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13). 
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1. Underverification 
E-Verify underverifies. Database inadequacies and user error create 
erroneous failures to confirm a small percentage of employees who are work 
authorized. In 2009, 2.6% of employees screened generated a tentative 
nonconfirmation response. Of the total number of tentative nonconfirmations, 
between 22% and 95% were erroneous.80 The reasons for these errors range from 
naming inconsistencies in employee documents (as when an employee’s name is 
recorded differently on one authorizing document than another), to data entry 
error by the employer, to inaccuracies in the SSA and DHS databases 
themselves.81 
Erroneous tentative nonconfirmations add uncertainty to the hiring process 
for both employers and employees. They may also lead to erroneous final 
nonconfirmations. The uncertainty that a tentative nonconfirmation introduces to 
the hiring process may lead some employers to use the system to unlawfully 
prescreen employees and then fail to inform the employee of the tentative 
nonconfirmation notice. E-Verify will then communicate that the employee is not 
authorized to work.82 
Even if employees are informed of the result, they may not take timely action 
to contact SSA or DHS to correct their documents or the information in the 
government databases.83 When they do, the process may take considerable time, 
require the employee to incur costs, and the employee may encounter bureaucratic 
barriers, including receiving a final nonconfirmation if the employee contacted the 
agency but failed to specify that the contact related to a nonconfirmation notice.84 
Without an appeal process, the employee may experience job loss with no formal 
avenue for redress. 
One could see this as a fundamentally empirical problem with an empirical 
solution, namely, making E-Verify more accurate. This would entail improving 
database management to reduce errors in the immigration and citizenship status 
database and making technological changes to render the system more discerning 
of lawful employees.85 
 
80. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 7 (reporting a modeled estimate of a 22% erroneous 
TNC rate nationwide and a survey-response-based finding of a 95% erroneous TNC rate in Los 
Angeles County) (citing WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13). 
81. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6–7; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 2–3, 19. 
82. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 7–14. 
83. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 6; GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 16. 
84. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 34–38 (“[I]f there is an error in a DHS database, 
individuals face formidable challenges in getting the inaccuracy or inconsistency corrected because, 
among other things, they have little information about what database led to the decision.”); see also id. 
at 34 (explaining that database errors require the employee to file a Privacy Act request to uncover the 
error, and “DHS processes Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act requests in the same 
manner, and the average response time for these requests in fiscal year 2009 was approximately 104 
days”). 
85. Id. at 17–19. 
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Even if more can be done to decrease erroneous failures to confirm work 
authorization due to system inaccuracies, many errors originate outside of 
government agencies. Increased accuracy requires reducing employer errors in 
using the system. A more daunting project is to motivate work-authorized U.S. 
employees to ensure the government has accurate information about them.86 As 
with any human system, complete accuracy is impossible. 
2. Discrimination 
Assuming that E-Verify works well enough to have a substantial impact on 
unauthorized employment, it remains open to criticism that it may cause or 
exacerbate discrimination. Others have painstakingly detailed the concern that E-
Verify increases discrimination against people of color, women, and work-
authorized noncitizens beyond that resulting from IRCA’s implementation.87 
Discrimination may manifest as an unintentional effect of errors in using E-Verify 
or as purposeful discriminatory misuse of the system. 
Erroneous failures to confirm the work authorization of work-authorized 
employees disparately impact women and minorities. Errors in the database 
resulting from misspellings of names, name-order reversals, or name changes 
during naturalization tend to fall more heavily on employees of color and those 
with diverse cultural backgrounds.88 Errors due to name changes resulting from 
marriage or divorce disparately impact women.89 
E-Verify errors more heavily impact noncitizens and foreign-born U.S. 
citizens than native-born U.S. citizens. DHS, which maintains information about 
the citizenship status of noncitizens and administers naturalization, generates 
more inaccurate failures to confirm work authorization than the SSA, which 
verifies the employment eligibility of most native-born U.S. citizens whose 
citizenship status is much more stable.90 
 
86. See id. at 20–21 (noting early efforts to educate employers and employees in order to 
improve error and correction rates). 
87. E.g., Griffith, supra note 13, at 424–26; Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 116 
(2009); Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding 
Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 923–24, 935–36 (2011); Rosenblum, 
supra note 59, at 7. 
88. Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 7–8; GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19 (“[I]ndividuals from 
certain cultural groups, such as those of Hispanic or Arab origin, may have multiple surnames that are 
recorded differently on their naturalization documents than on their Social Security cards. Such names 
could be recorded in a different order on the two documents, or one document may contain all the 
surnames while the other document may contain an abbreviated version of the surnames.”). 
89. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19. 
90. See id. at 8–11 (describing how E-Verify queries government databases); WESTAT 
REPORT, supra note 13, at 208–12 (setting out error rates that differed depending on whether the 
employee was a native born U.S. citizen (0.1%), lawful permanent resident (1.0%), foreign born U.S. 
citizen (3.2%), or lawful nonimmigrant, such as a temporary visa holder (5.3%)); Rosenblum, supra 
note 59, at 7, 19 nn.26–27 (explaining the difference between SSA and DHS error rates and noting 
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Intentional discrimination through misuse of the E-Verify system is also 
possible. Employers may purposefully discriminate by unlawfully using E-Verify 
to either selectively screen only new hires who they suspect of being unauthorized, 
or to prescreen applicants and then fail to hire or notify those who receive 
tentative nonconfirmations. Employers who rely on unauthorized employees 
could choose not to use E-Verify for that class of workers, or (for the truly 
brazen) use E-Verify to discover which applicants receive tentative 
nonconfirmations and then hire them, discriminating against those who are work-
authorized.91 
These avenues of discrimination lead to a larger harm. Cynthia Estlund has 
posited that the workplace is one of the most racially integrated places in most 
employees’ lives and can therefore act, even in a limited way, as a place where 
democratic integration can occur.92 Immigration and national security are two 
areas where government actions based on ethnicity and “otherness” are most 
visible. If they come to have a greater presence in the workplace, there are two 
potential effects. First, when E-Verify’s errors fall more heavily on noncitizens or 
employees of color, they can exacerbate employer and coworker perceptions that 
employees of color have a precarious or partial status in the United States and by 
extension in the workplace.93 Second, it will become more difficult to distinguish 
when an employer’s discriminatory acts arise from ordinary bias and when those 
acts arise from a desire to comply with the employer’s immigration enforcement 
duties. 
3. Affirmative Misuse 
Looking beyond the direct impact of E-Verify on screened employees, E-
Verify has also inspired concerns that it will become a vehicle for employers to 
misuse the system to gain unfair advantage over employees as a group. This 
concern about employer misuse of their immigration screening power echoes 
longstanding critiques of IRCA’s employment verification requirements.94 The 
 
that the SSA database is more accurate because of the agency’s longstanding effort to register U.S. 
citizen children with the SSA at birth). 
91. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 30, 41; Rosenblum, supra note 5968, at 7, 11. 
92. See ESTLUND, supra note 5, at 64–69, 134–39. 
93. E.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, Three Theories of Discrimination in the Brown Collar Workplace, 2009 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 345 (2009) (exploring alternative discrimination theories and applying them to the 
low-wage immigrant workplace where immigrant workers are perceived as less entitled to work). 
94. E.g., Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 540 (2007) 
(laying out the ways in which “sanctions rendered undocumented immigrants more vulnerable, less 
likely to report violations of minimum wage and other workplace standards, cheaper, and increasingly 
resistant to organizing efforts” and stating that sanctions “increased the appeal of undocumented 
workers to unscrupulous employers and gave employers a way to derail organizing campaigns in 
immigrant-heavy workplaces”); Lee, supra note 37, at 1103, 1138 (2009) (“[E]mployers should be 
punished for using their screening authority beyond the scope of its intended use, which often means 
employers using reporting and the threat of reporting to avoid liability for labor and employment 
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employer sanctions laws gave employers two new government-sanctioned powers 
over employees, with the threat of government enforcement behind them. The 
first was the power to solicit certain information from employees about their 
citizenship or immigration status and to demand evidence in the form of 
government-issued documents. 
The second was the power to take adverse employment action against 
employees based on their response, such as requiring further evidence of work 
authorization or terminating employees who did not provide any or adequate 
documentation. Critics charged that this acquisition of power and the lack of an 
effective scheme to combat discrimination or deter misuse undermined workplace 
protections for undocumented workers and therefore for all employees.95 
If E-Verify assists ill-intentioned employers to disrupt labor organizing, 
depress wages, and circumvent other employment protections, there is a tension 
between its immigration enforcement goal and existing workplace protections for 
employees. Stephen Lee has framed this tension as a problem of “mission 
mismatch.”96 Immigration agencies and employers have different missions, one 
that is enforcement-driven and the other profit-driven. By passing the employer 
sanctions laws, Congress essentially tasked employers with an immigration 
enforcement role in much the way Congress empowers and directs agencies to 
take on and fulfill an executive role. This created a danger, however, that 
employers would use their immigration powers for their private interest in 
increasing profits. Those new powers changed the balance of power between 
employer and employee, creating opportunities to decrease wages and other 
benefits.97 
E-Verify has the potential to exacerbate this problem. That potential is 
limited because, in the event of a raid or audit, E-Verify reduces the unscrupulous 
employer’s ability to claim uncertainty about the lawful status of its employees. 
However, E-Verify provides employers with more information about who on 
 
violations.”); see Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward A Dialectical Model of White-Collar 
Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1052 (1990) (“[U]ndocumented workers are particularly prevalent 
in industries where competition is intense.”); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 
96 GEO. L.J. 777, 821–24 (2008) (describing documented increases in discrimination resulting from 
IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions). For comprehensive analyses of the employer sanctions laws, 
see Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United 
States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955 (1988) (describing the history and consequences of employer 
sanctions), Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of 
Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737 (2003), Lori A. Nessel, 
Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001), and Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004). 
95. See Gordon, supra note 94 at 540; Lee, supra note 37 at 1103, 1138; Pham, supra note 94 at 
821–24. 
96. Stephen Lee, Monitoring Immigration Enforcement, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1089 (2011). 
97. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 94 at 539–40. 
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their workforce is unauthorized to work, without actually forcing employers to fire 
them.98 As a result, the system shifts the already contested balance of power 
between employer and employee in ways that may enable undertrained or 
unscrupulous employers to misuse the greater information that the system 
provides about individual employees.99 In other words, E-Verify gives the 
employer a choice. It can pursue the immigration mission or misuse the 
information to ensure a more compliant, less costly workforce. 
Addressing this kind of employer misuse is challenging. The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Office of Special Counsel for 
Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices, and private lawsuits enforce 
the antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII and the citizenship status and 
national origin discrimination protections of IRCA.100 However, those statutes 
require a showing that the employer used E-Verify to discriminate because of race, 
ethnicity, national origin, or citizenship status, and in the case of citizenship status, 
that the discrimination was intentional.101 
At present, there is no effective avenue to protect employees from employer 
misuse of E-Verify. As the Government Accountability Office reported, the 
immigration agency is “not in the position to determine whether employers carry 
out activities required by E-Verify, such as posting notice of their participation in 
the E-Verify program, providing employees the letter informing them of TNC 
findings, or referring employees to the appropriate agency to resolve” a tentative 
nonconfirmation.102 Employers are not supposed to take adverse actions in 
response to a tentative failure to confirm work eligibility, but immigration officials 
are “generally not in the position to determine whether employers engage in 
 
98. Rosenblum, supra note 59 at 14; Fernando Lozano & Todd Sørensen, The Labor Market 
Effects of Immigration Reform, 4 POLICY MATTERS 5–6 (2011) (summarizing quantitative literature 
exploring employer exploitation of undocumented employees and undertaking an economic study of 
the difference in wages resulting from IRCA’s legalization program). 
99. Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 14 (noting that E-Verify does not require employers to hire 
legal workers, and in fact gives them a “better tool to distinguish between legal and unauthorized 
workers”). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006); see Kati L. Griffith, Response Essay, 
ICE Was Not Meant to Be Cold: The Case for Civil Rights Monitoring of Immigration Enforcement at the 
Workplace, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137 (2011) (recommending that the EEOC play a role in educating the 
public about the civil rights of employees with respect to immigration enforcement and in monitoring 
immigration workplace enforcement activities); Lee, supra note 96 (proposing empowering the 
Department of Labor to play a monitoring role in immigration enforcement actions in the workplace); 
see also Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for 
Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 303 (2010 ); Leticia M. Saucedo, 
The Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Occupations, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 303, 318–19 (2004) (advocating cooperation between the DOL, EEOC and USCIS 
for the protection of immigrant workers). 
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006); but cf. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ, 
IMMIGRATION LAW & POLICY 997 (5th ed. 2009) (critiquing the interpretation of the 
antidiscrimination provision as requiring intent). 
102. See GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 30. 
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activities prohibited by E-Verify, such as limiting the pay of or terminating 
employees who receive TNCs, using E-Verify to prescreen job applicants, or 
screening employees who are not new hires.”103 Moreover, there are no remedies 
under federal law for employees fired or otherwise injured due to the employer’s 
failure to meet E-Verify’s worker protection requirements.104 
IV. E-VERIFY AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIFFUSE LIBERTY INTERESTS 
Looking ahead, E-Verify will almost certainly assume center stage in 
comprehensive immigration reform.105 If E-Verify comes into nationwide use, 
either through federal legislation or de facto as a result of state mandates, court 
challenges are on the horizon.106 These challenges to E-Verify will take many 
forms: constitutional arguments, statutory interpretation of IRCA and IRRIRA 
among others, and challenges to agency actions. They are likely to raise both 
equality and due process themes, either directly as constitutional challenges or 
more obliquely as norms that influence statutory interpretation and guide agency 
discretion.107 
This Part sketches these challenges and the major barriers to their success. It 
then evaluates the impact of E-Verify on the liberty interest that mainstream U.S. 
workers have in access to work. If immigration enforcement affects citizens in 
large numbers, even when the impact to each individual is small, citizens become 
engaged in an issue that affects noncitizens and courts may expand the horizon of 
their reasoning to the liberty interests of the ordinary citizen. This Part maps these 
mainstream interests and then circles back to analyze how those interests overlap 
with the interests of the employees whom E-Verify most heavily affects. 
 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See Julia Preston, Separate Bills Focus on Two Pieces of Immigration Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, June 
16, 2011, at A22 (describing proposed legislation that would expand the use of E-Verify); Daily 
Comp. Pres. Docs., 2011 DCPD No. 00479, 12–13 (June 29, 2011) (President Obama expressing 
commitment to E-Verify in a news conference); Spencer S. Hsu, Obama Revives Bush Idea of Using E-
Verify to Catch Illegal Contract Workers, WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/08/AR2009070800030.html; see also Hiroshi Motomura, What Is 
“Comprehensive Immigration Reform”?: Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225, 227 (2010) 
(summarizing prior draft legislation). 
106. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985–87 (2011) (upholding state law 
requiring Arizona employers to use E-Verify); see id. at 1973 (stating that “[t]he question presented is 
whether federal immigration law preempts” a state law that “requires that all Arizona employers use a 
federal electronic verification system to confirm that the workers they employ are legally authorized 
workers,” and holding that federal law did not preempt the Arizona law). 
107. See generally Motomura, supra note 17 (describing indirect approaches to arguments that 
successfully raise the interests of migrants outside the law); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 
(1990) (tracing the influence of “phantom” constitutional norms in statutory interpretation). 
Assembled_V2I1_v7 (Do Not Delete) 4/24/2012  10:38 PM 
2012] GETTING TO WORK 405 
 
A. Equality Arguments and Interest Convergence 
Challenges to E-Verify will raise the impact of the program on employees of 
diverse ethnicities, cultural backgrounds and citizenship status.108 These challenges 
tend to take form as equality arguments or due process challenges or a 
combination of both, alleging that the disproportionate impact of E-Verify on 
protected classes of employees arbitrarily and unlawfully deprives them of their 
livelihood. 
A response is the argument that the program reduces discrimination because 
when employers use E-Verify properly, screening all employees after hire, they 
have no need to rely inappropriately on appearance or accent. Another facet of 
this argument is that E-Verify protects low wage jobs often held by U.S. 
employees of color.109 
Equality arguments also face the intrinsic difficulty of asserting the interests 
of a minority against a public good, here the underlying goal of reducing unlawful 
migration. By nature, democratic institutions tend to overlook minority interests. 
When the costs of E-Verify predictably fall more heavily on minorities, and there 
is a perceived benefit to the majority, democratic institutions will inherently lean 
toward implementing the majoritarian interest. 
Arguments on behalf of discrete minority groups are at their most 
compelling when they draw upon the intertwined interests of mainstream U.S. 
workers and minority employees.110 If the interests of the U.S. workforce dovetail 
with the interests of noncitizens or employees of color, courts and other 
policymakers are likely to exhibit greater solicitude for those interests.111 The late 
Derrick Bell dubbed this “interest convergence.”112 Hiroshi Motomura has offered 
 
108. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(analyzing claims that E-Verify would increase discrimination and concluding that there was 
insufficient proof of heightened discrimination); see also Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of 
State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 592–93 (2009) 
(analyzing the Chicanos opinion); Shelly Chandra Patel, Note, E-Verify: An Exceptionalist System 
Embedded in the Immigration Reform Battle Between Federal and State Governments, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 453, 471–72 (2010) (raising concerns that E-Verify will promote the creation of a concentrated 
subordinated class of undocumented immigrants). 
109. See Randall G. Shelley, Jr., If You Want Something Done Right . . . : Chicanos Por La Causa v. 
Napolitano and the Return of Federalism to Immigration Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 603, 630–36 (2010) 
(arguing that an Arizona law mandating use of E-Verify reduced potential employer liability and 
benefitted citizen workers and that concerns about the law leading to discrimination were overstated 
and counteracted by protections built in to IRCA). 
110. Bell, supra note 16, at 22 (describing the interest-convergence theory). 
111. See Motomura, supra note 17, at 1728 (explaining several ways in which unauthorized 
migrants may assert “oblique versions of rights that U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents can 
exercise in the same settings”). 
112. Bell, supra note 16, at 22 (positing that “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality 
is accommodated only when that interest converges with the interests of whites in policy-making 
positions” and that this convergence “is far more important to gaining relief than is the degree of 
harm suffered by blacks or the character of proof offered to prove this harm”). 
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a similar theory specific to noncitizens, demonstrating that successful legal 
arguments are those that line up the interests of unauthorized migrants with those 
of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants.113 
B. Evaluating the Interests of the Majority 
The interests of the majority, then, can be critical to protecting the 
overlapping interests of a minority. Understanding these mainstream interests is a 
first step to resolving whether the interests of the majority of employees converge 
sufficiently with those employees whom E-Verify most heavily impacts. That 
interest convergence may inspire a higher level of protection against arbitrary 
deprivation of employment. 
1. The Mainstream Liberty Interest in Access to Work 
Together, E-Verify and IRCA constitute a grand experiment that engages the 
entire U.S. workforce in enforcing immigration law, while imposing some costs on 
that workforce. Immigration control strategies that impact those outside of the 
targeted group of noncitizens traditionally have been associated with U.S. borders, 
like the creation of a passport requirement and an inspection system for border 
crossings,114 or have imposed short-term impositions on liberties, such as 
workplace raids or highway stops. 
Assessing the legal implications of IRCA and E-Verify’s inclusion of U.S. 
employees in modern immigration enforcement requires evaluating whether the 
system makes inroads on a lawfully protected interest. Courts reviewing the 
lawfulness of the enforcement strategy may scrutinize the benefits and costs to the 
majority in determining whether it imparts adequate due process, provides equal 
protection of the law, or constitutes a purely federal scheme that preempts state 
involvement. 
The at-will employment doctrine undermines claims to a constitutional-style 
right to access the workplace. By permitting loss of employment at the irrational 
whim of the employer,115 the doctrine complicates the argument that employees 
enjoy an entitlement to employment, a fundamental right to work. Equality 
arguments framed this way are anemic for another reason. In the usual course of 
 
113. Motomura, supra note 17, at 1728 (“Unauthorized migrants can assert their rights in 
practical effect—albeit indirectly and incompletely—by adopting at least five general patterns . . . . All 
five patterns allow unauthorized migrants to assert oblique versions of rights that U.S. citizens or 
lawful permanent residents can exercise in the same settings.”). 
114. See Jeffrey Kahn, How the United States Controlled International Travel Before the Age of 
Terrorism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 819, 831 (2011) (tracing the history of the U.S. passport “from a 
diplomatic letter of introduction to a license to control mass travel”). 
115. B. Glenn George, Justice in Simplicity: Perspectives on Knowledge and Access in American 
Employment Law, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 385 (“There is no general or universal protection for 
employees that prohibits unfairness or irrational whims in the workplace, unless the employer has 
acted with a specific motivation prohibited by statute.”). 
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E-Verify implementation, employees are not intentionally selected for 
nonconfirmation of employment eligibility on the basis of a protected ground, like 
race or sex. 
We are left to explore whether a liberty interest in access to work might 
spark due process protection. Here too, the lack of an entitlement to work 
provides slippery footing for the argument that loss of employment equates to a 
deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. However, borrowing from 
nonattainder literature on blacklists, liberty interests encompass more than the 
privilege to do something—a freedom to work. They also include immunity from 
being treated in a certain way by the government.116 
From that viewpoint, the liberty interest here is the right not to be deprived 
of employment through arbitrary government action. Another way of articulating 
this is to say that deprivation of the freedom to engage in the lawful behavior of 
working requires due process of law if it is to avoid arbitrariness.117 The wrinkle 
here is that government does not carry out the deprivation of employment, but 
rather gives to another private entity—the employer—a lawful reason to use the 
employer’s power to discharge. 
2. Aggregating the Risk of Deprivation 
Evaluating whether courts or other decision makers will recognize such a 
deprivation depends to some extent on the likelihood of harm to mainstream 
employees. The risk of harm to the majority of employees as a result of large-scale 
implementation of E-Verify falls into two categories. First, E-Verify represents a 
risk of arbitrary deprivation of work. Assuming current error rates, it is certain that 
some harm will fall improperly on some U.S. workers. 
Evaluation of E-Verify tends to consider the implications of the system ex 
post, after the database has responded to a records check on an employee. This 
Article takes an ex ante perspective, before any employee has taken the risk of 
submitting identity and work authorization information to the system. In contrast 
to the ex post analysis with its focus on specific harms to individuals or particular 
groups such as minorities, the ex ante perspective sheds light on the risks that 
national implementation of E-Verify poses to employees as a class. 
The risk to any particular individual of erroneous loss of access to work is 
very small. As of now, only 2.6% of all new hires receive even a tentative non-
confirmation of their employment status. Statistical modeling has estimated that 
 
116. See Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1209, 1226 
(2010) (“When a government official arbitrarily deprives someone of the freedom to engage in lawful 
behavior—even behavior that could be banned by a proper statute, like drinking alcohol—the 
deprivation should not occur without due process of law.”). 
117. Id. 
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between 0.6% and 1.0% (approximately 0.8%) of all E-Verify inquiries resulted in 
an erroneous tentative nonconfirmation.118 
Even if the risk of error was the same on average for every new employee, 
and was not affected by cultural background, gender, or immigration status, an 
erroneous nonconfirmation from an individual point of view seems very 
unlikely.119 The perception of E-Verify as an immigration program may also 
exaggerate that perception of negligible risk—that it is so unlikely as to be beneath 
notice. 
Even if it were to occur, U.S. workers may feel confident that the error could 
be quickly corrected by contacting the appropriate government agency. Given this 
frame, most individual U.S. workers will have little incentive to oppose E-Verify. 
Multiplied across the population of U.S. employees, however, the harm of E-
Verify error becomes a large ex post reality for thousands of employees. Errors due 
to name mismatches alone (setting aside other types of errors and disregarding 
employer misuse of the system) currently would result in 22,512 erroneous initial 
failures to confirm work authorization under a national mandate.120 U.S. citizens 
would account for 17,098 (76%) of those errors.121 Assuming about 60 million 
queries per year, about 164,000 newly hired citizens and noncitizens would receive 
an erroneous tentative nonconfirmation related to a name mismatch.122 One 
report estimates that at current error rates, national implementation of E-Verify 
would result in 600,000 U.S. workers receiving erroneous nonconfirmations per 
year.123 A decision to apply E-Verify to all U.S. employees and not just new hires 
would multiply that number.124 
Moreover, mandatory national use of E-Verify may increase the impact on 
employees. Currently the businesses that use E-Verify are disproportionately large. 
They are therefore more likely to have human resource departments who can 
acquire expertise in using the system and train the personnel responsible for 
implementing it. Each has signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
government affirmatively agreeing to follow E-Verify’s procedures, which 
 
118. WESTAT REPORT, supra note 13. 
119. The risk for those with legal status may increase if E-Verify is nationally mandated, 
because the desirability of stolen or borrowed identity documents will also increase. If E-Verify 
detects that two people are using the same employment verification information, it will generate a 
tentative nonconfirmation for both. 
120. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19 (“According to USCIS, of 22,512 TNCs resulting 
from name mismatches in fiscal year 2009, approximately 76 percent, or 17,098, were for citizens, and 
approximately 24 percent, or 5,414, were for noncitizens.”). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. See Rosenblum, supra note 59, at 12 (citing GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-08-895T, EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION: CHALLENGES EXIST IN IMPLEMENTING A 
MANDATORY ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION SYSTEM 10 (June 10, 2008)); WESTAT 
REPORT, supra note 13, at 117, 157. 
124. GAO REPORT, supra note 45, at 19. 
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establishes a more positive environment for employer compliance with E-Verify’s 
procedures than a legislative decree. 
3. Complicating the Risk of Deprivation 
Policymakers often face the dilemma of whether to implement solutions that 
create some collateral harms. Raising the speed limit from fifty-five to seventy 
miles per hour allows many people to travel more quickly from one point to the 
other, but at a greater cost in road fatalities. It is tempting to frame the question of 
national implementation of E-Verify merely as a policy call about whether the 
system is accurate enough. 
Two aspects of E-Verify belie the simplicity of framing the issue in that way. 
First, unlike a car accident, the harm results from government action itself. It 
results from the implementation of the E-Verify program, from errors in its 
databases, and from the collateral failures of employers and others. Unlike a speed 
limit, which manages an existing risk created by traffic, the risk of an erroneous 
firing results directly and solely from the government program. 
Second, the challenge here for policymakers such as legislatures, agencies, 
and courts, is that the ex post nature of evaluating E-Verify’s impact on U.S. 
workers complicates an understanding of how much harm a national mandate 
might create. From the ex ante perspective, E-Verify creates a risk to a profoundly 
important liberty interest in access to employment. For work-authorized 
employees on an individual level, however, that risk is exceedingly small. Gaining 
perspective on that risk requires evaluating the aggregate of those individual 
interests across the working population as a whole. In pursuit of immigration 
enforcement goals, E-Verify creates a very small risk of a significant and 
erroneous harm to individual interests in employment, dispersed across a majority 
of the population, paired with the larger risk that the harmful error will fall on a 
minority of the population.125 
Courts and scholars have long noted that when a liberty interest is shared by 
many, the costs of organizing large, diffuse constituents can undercut the ability of 
that group to protect it.126 Protecting such broadly held interests is especially 
difficult when the liberty is not lost, but merely threatened. It is especially 
 
125. See infra notes 130–33. 
126. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 151–53 (1980) (analyzing the 
meaning of “discrete and insular” in the Carolene footnote); John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse 
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 729–36 (1974) (explaining the Carolene footnote and the 
“special scrutiny accorded racial classifications”); Leslie Gentile, Note, Giving Effect to Equal Protection: 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 AKRON L. REV. 397, 400 n.22 (1996) (summarizing the equal 
protection jurisprudence springing from the Carolene footnote). 
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challenging when the risk of that threat materializing is small, contingent, or 
distant in time. 
This matters for legislatures because, as representatives of the majority, they 
are tasked with making decisions based on the best interest of their constituents. It 
matters for courts because, according to the interest-convergence theory, failure to 
understand the interest of the majority will lead to suboptimal outcomes for both 
minorities and the majority. 
Although the risk to work-authorized employees is small and may seem 
smaller still because of the public perception of E-Verify as an immigration 
program, there is reason to believe that the risk of loss of access to work will 
impact the public response to E-Verify. Enforcing immigration law using the 
mainstream U.S. workforce may precipitate a shift in the public’s perspectives 
about immigration control. 
Successful efforts to change norms in U.S. civil society have done so by 
shifting the focus from the minority that experiences the most concentrated 
harms, such as smokers, to the impact on a larger group, such as non-smokers.127 
Once the public perceives a safety risk to itself, it becomes a matter of general 
concern. If immigration control creates a collateral risk to U.S. workers of job loss 
or decline in workplace protections, U.S. employees may object to having that risk 
imposed upon them.128 Nor does the risk have to be large to change attitudes. 
Research on risk perception has established that awareness of a particular risk is 
enough to change attitudes even if the size of the risk is unknown.129 
C. The Challenge of Diffuse, Contingent Harms 
The risk of an erroneous failure to confirm work authorization is only one 
potential harm that national implementation of E-Verify raises. Other more 
 
127. See Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 139, 172–75 (2010) (noting that “the problems that arouse the greatest concern 
throughout the community are often those that pose, or at least are perceived as posing, a genuine 
safety risk to the public at large” and using nonsmoking campaigns as an example); Dan M. Kahan, 
Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 632 (2000) 
(constructing an incrementalist strategy of norm-changing and describing a backlash against gradual 
criminalization of marijuana possession in which “at the point at which the law began to be applied to 
white middle-class college students, members of the social mainstream began to object, triggering a 
self-reinforcing wave of opposition”) (citing JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
MARIHUANA: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA 99–105 (1983)). 
128. Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 127, at 174 (noting that although “Americans consider it 
an aspect of their individual freedom to assume personal risks, they have little tolerance for risks that 
others impose upon them”) (quoting NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED, SECONDARY SMOKING, INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC SPACE, available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/Views/Exhibit/narrative/ 
secondary.html). 
129. Clinton M. Jenkin, Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the Psychometric Paradigm, 2 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 1, 1 (2006). 
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diffuse and indirect harms pose similar challenges for evaluating the benefits of a 
national E-Verify mandate. 
The first of these harms is that E-Verify by its nature entails a constriction of 
the liberty of every U.S. employee. Outside of immigration law, one of the 
freedoms that U.S. citizens and permanent residents traditionally have enjoyed 
relates to whether and where they work. This is a freedom from arbitrary 
government intrusion into the creation of the employment relationship. We tend 
to see the employer, not the government, as the sole gatekeeper of who is hired 
and whether employees keep their jobs. Beyond the broad frames that wage and 
hour, safety, and other employment laws provide, we accept, for the most part, 
some level of coercion from the employer about where we work, when we work, 
and what we do there.130 The idea that one must receive permission from the 
government to work for a particular employer, however, is not part of the national 
consciousness. 
All that changed in 1986. When IRCA created employer sanctions and 
charged employers with employment eligibility verification, it transformed 
relatively private decision making about access to the workplace into a regime in 
which the government authorized employees to work. That authorization 
necessarily included U.S. citizens. IRCA made the access to employment of every 
person contingent on the permission of the U.S. government. 
E-Verify takes this a step further by involving the government in each 
individual hire. It makes the decision of every employer to hire any employee 
contingent on the permission of the U.S. government. The 1986 employer 
sanctions laws and the expansion of E-Verify mean that the government can, in 
the national interest, trump an employer’s choice about who to hire if that choice 
implicates who may enter the country and who may leave. 
Few employees think of it that way. E-Verify will change that, making visible 
to the public IRCA’s transformation of the government’s role in authorizing 
access to work. As the computer receives and examines the employee’s 
information, E-Verify brings DHS virtually into every workplace. It makes DHS 
an active participant in deciding whether employees keep their jobs. 
The second of these diffuse and indirect effects of implementing E-Verify 
nationally is that it will normalize the role of government in using access to the 
workplace as a legitimate location for law enforcement. Outside of immigration 
enforcement, when the government steps into the workplace it is usually on the 
side of the employee in the form of employment discrimination laws, worker 
safety regulations, or labor protections. When the government-centered 
framework of immigration law meets up with the mainstream employee’s 
experience of the workplace as relatively free from government coercion, the 
 
130. This coercion is limited, of course, to the extent that employees have the freedom to quit 
or the bargaining power to negotiate these terms, either individually or collectively. 
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nature of the workplace alters. The role of government becomes very visible when 
employment encounters immigration enforcement. 
A third effect of E-Verify is in providing a new role in immigration 
enforcement to a set of powerful actors: the states. The growing trend for states to 
require employers to use E-Verify is a pathway for states to claim a greater role in 
the social control of migrants through a larger presence in the creation of the 
employment relationship. This means that states will take a greater part in 
employees’ access to work and in decisions about who the employer hires or 
retains. These laws use employment as a means of furthering other enforcement 
goals and perhaps reflect underlying concerns about the changing racial and ethnic 
demographics within and around state borders. 
Fourth, Estlund’s work on the democratic value of integration suggests 
another overlapping interest.131 If, as she suggests, the workplace is where most 
American employees experience the greatest racial integration, protecting the 
workplace from discriminatory harms that undermine that integration becomes a 
mainstream value. That mainstream value lines up with the interests of minority 
groups. Mainstream employees and minorities have an overlapping interest in 
ensuring that immigration enforcement vehicles like E-Verify do not undermine 
the potential of the workplace for continued racial integration. 
E-Verify raises a final potential harm, one that is still more difficult to 
evaluate because it represents a future contingency. David Cole has written about 
how immigration law often acts as the wedge for government curtailment of 
mainstream liberty.132 The role of the agencies in charge of E-Verify is 
immigration enforcement, but the mission of DHS is broader than immigration. 
Its central focus is national security. What E-Verify provides to DHS is 
information about every U.S. employee who passes through the computerized 
system. It may be tempting, at some future point, to use that information or E-
Verify’s call-in apparatus for purposes beyond immigration enforcement. 
These harms, even more than the ex ante evaluation of the empirical risk of 
error and the concerns about employer misuse, are unquantifiable and follow only 
indirectly from national implementation of E-Verify. Identifying these harms does 
not answer the question of whether E-Verify should remain a voluntary program 
or become a national mandate. They are, nonetheless, factors that should enter 
into the national conversation about E-Verify because they are likely to have a 
widespread effect on the population of U.S. employees. National implementation 
of E-Verify will have national impact. Naming these harms makes clear that E-
Verify is not just an immigration enforcement program, but a passage through 
which law enforcement may permeate the workplace. 
 
131. See supra notes 92 and accompanying text. 
132. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2002). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article does not answer the larger questions of whether national 
implementation of E-Verify is constitutional, or politically feasible, or even a good 
idea. Its humbler aspiration is to enable a more nuanced dialogue about the 
program by shifting some attention to the mainstream employees who will be the 
most numerous group affected by E-Verify’s effort to carry out its immigration 
enforcement mission. 
To the extent that mainstream interests differ from those of the 
undocumented workers that E-Verify targets or the groups that E-Verify most 
disparately impacts, the impact of E-Verify on the majority of employees may 
shed light on immigration enforcement approaches that similarly engage groups 
larger than the targeted group. In the same way that the prevalence of the passport 
for international travel and the rise of border control reimagined the U.S. 
geography as a space enclosed by a thickly lined boundary,133 E-Verify and 
employer sanctions could transform the workplace into a conscious locus of 
immigration control in which the potential for unlawful status becomes 
forefronted among employees and employers. 
As E-Verify comes into nationwide use, either by way of a federal legislative 
or regulatory mandate or through the expansion of state laws mandating that 
public and private employers use the system, it will transform the way all 
employees—citizens and noncitizens—perceive of their access to employment. It 
will enlarge mainstream understandings of who plays a role in whether someone 
gets a job, expanding the cast of decision makers beyond the employer. It formally 
redesignates the workplace as inhabited not just by employer and employees, but 
also by government and its concerns about immigration and national security. 
E-Verify, together with IRCA, acts as a portal for governments—federal and 
state—to have a stronger presence at the inception of the employment 
relationship. At the same time, it gives employers greater powers to choose 
whether to use the E-Verify results only for immigration enforcement or also for 
their own goals. At bottom, then, it gives employers, the federal government, and 
the states a greater scope of power over access to employment. That creates a 
concomitant loss of freedom for all employees. 
Work is central to belonging in our society.134 This Article began by setting 
out a few of its functions: to generate income, to sustain ourselves and family, 
 
133. See Kahn, supra note 114, at 841 (discussing the role of the passport in initiating controls 
at the U.S.-Mexico border). 
134. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 101 (1991) 
(situating the “right to earn” as critical to the sense of belonging to American society); Shannon 
Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 591–92 (summarizing the results of a study of undocumented workers in  
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obtain goods, and enhance our leisure time. Work also has social and personal 
meaning. If it is true that work is one of the most racially integrated places in our 
society, and therefore has the potential to further democratic integration, then we 
should be very careful about how we allow the government to use the delicate 




California and Texas restaurants and concluding that the undocumented respondents saw their 
“position in the United States as based on an understanding that they will work harder and longer 
than other Americans”). 
